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CHAPTER 6 
Commercial Law 
ALFRED I. MALESON 
§6.1. General. The number of states that have adopted the Uni-
form Commercial Code has more than doubled since the end of the 
1960 SURVEY year, with New Jersey numbered as the fourteenth. The 
Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code was affected by only a 
single amendment - an increase in the fee for filing papers concerning 
secured transactions from $3 to $4, whenever the filing must be done in 
a registry of deeds because the transaction affects real property.l 
Chapter 172 of the General Laws, relating to trust companies, has 
been completely revised.2 Although much of the prior chapter has 
been retained, there are many changes of detail and of substance. 
Other statutes of importance, in addition to a number of detailed 
changes in banking legislation, include further regulation of consumer 
credit,S but still no general retail instalment sales act. 
Decided cases were concerned with fundamental principles of com-
merciallaw. One case involved payment of a forged instrument, with 
the Supreme Judicial Court discussing the famous eighteenth century 
case of Price v. Neal- the case in which the English court made the 
shocking statement that the forgeries were committed by one Lee, who 
had since been hanged for forgery. A second commercial law case 
involved the elements of purchase in good faith, and - shades of 
Price v. Neal- one of the principals was subsequently incarcerated in 
Norfolk prison.4 A third case added important refinements to the 
doctrine of implied warranties raised in sales. A fourth case required 
a determination of the time that risk of loss of sold goods passes when 
the goods have been destroyed before effective insurance coverage has 
been obtained. 
§6.2. Sales: Risk of loss. The risk of loss of goods that have been 
sold generally follows title under the Uniform Sales Act. If title is 
retained by the seller for security purposes only, however, the retention 
of such title does not prevent the risk of loss from passing to the 
ALFRED I. MALESoN is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§6.1. 1 Acts of 1961, c. un. 
2 Id., c. 493. 
S See §6.6 supra. 
4 For a statement on this incarceration, see Elbar Realty, Inc. v. Shapiro, 342 
Mass. 276, 173 N.E.2d 254 (1961). The case does not involve commercial law 
problems and is not reviewed in this chapter. 
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purchaser. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a determination 
of the time that the risk of loss passes to the buyer is made independ-
ently of the determination of the time that title passes. Accordingly, a 
determination of whether a sale is absolute or conditional is im-
material to a determination of the time that the risk of loss will fall 
upon the buyer, under the prior as well as under the present statutory 
schemes of Massachusetts. 
However,'while the risk of loss may pass to the buyer irrespective of 
whether the sale is conditional, the seller may have an insurable 
interest in the goods that have been sold and delivered under a con-
ditional sale contract even though the risk has passed to the buyer. 
If the seller with such an insurable interest has a policy of insurance, 
and if the goods are lost by a casualty insured against after only a 
partial payment by the buyer, the buyer may have some rights under 
the policy that will reduce the loss he must bear. 
This possibility was one of the hopes of the plaintiff-buyer in 
Waltham Door & Window Co. v. S. A. Woods Machine CO.1 The 
plaintiff had contracted to purchase machinery from the defendant by 
signing a printed contract that, although in form a contract for con-
ditional sale, had its blanks filled in with the anomalous requirement 
that the purchaser pay the entire balance owing (after a small amount 
paid at the time of signing) upon notification that the machinery was 
ready for delivery. This printed contract was not executed by the de-
fendant-seIler. Instead, the defendant executed a printed form that it 
used to acknowledge orders for absolute sales. The machinery was 
loaded onto the plaintiff's truck on a Friday, and arrived at the plain-
tiff's plant on Saturday. The plaintiff's check for the balance owing 
was received by the defendant on the same Saturday. 
Although the machinery had been insured by the plaintiff during 
the transit, it was not insured after its arrival on Saturday because of 
weekend difficulties, and it was destroyed by fire in the early hours of 
Monday morning. The defendant, on the other hand, had a policy 
of insurance covering equipment on location under instalment sales 
contracts. The conditional sale agreement that the plaintiff had 
signed contained a clause requiring the purchaser to reimburse the 
vendor for the cost of insurance. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decided that a finding that the sale was 
not intended as a conditional sale was justified under the circum-
stances. As an absolute sale, risk of loss as well as title passed to the 
plaintiff upon delivery to its truck. Furthermore, since the sale was 
not conditional, the terms in the printed contract form relating to 
insurance were not part of the actual agreement between the parties. 
Therefore, the plaintiff's rights under the terms in a true conditional 
sale contract, if any, did not have to be determined. 
Had the Uniform Commercial Code been in force when this sale 
occurred, the result would have been the same although the judicial 
technique might have been slightly different. Irrespective of whether 
§6.2. 1342 Mass. 335, 173 N.E.2d 265 (1961). 
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the sale was conditional, the risk of loss was on the buyer from the time 
of delivery to his truck.2 If the sale were conditional, however, the 
seller would have had an insurable interest in the goods so long as he 
had a security interest.8 In order to determine whether the sale was 
conditional, the Court would have been assisted by Section 2-207(3), 
which provides: 
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the 
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In 
such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those 
terms on which the writings of the parties agree. . . . 
With the aid of these pronouncements, the Court might have felt easier 
about trying to piece together the actual agreement of these parties, 
one of whom signed a printed conditional sale agreement that obvi-
ously was not intended to provide the terms of a cash sale, and the 
other of whom signed an acceptance form that was not at all responsive 
to the terms printed in the conditional sale contract except for the de-
scription of the subject matter, terms of shipment, and terms of pay-
ment. 
This case, involving as it did the completely haphazard use of 
printed forms to cover what seemed at the time to be a simple legal 
situation, emphasizes the importance of care in the drafting of any 
agreement of sale. Among other things, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, through its broad description of insurable interests, allows tre-
mendous flexibility in matters of risk of loss and possible coverage by 
insurance. It might be hoped that these provisions will be reflected 
by the appearance of contracts that have been drafted to provide for 
contingencies that the parties at the time of contracting consider too 
remote to be worth special attention. 
§6.3. Sales: Warranties. If there was any doubt left by prior 
Massachusetts cases about the application of implied warranties to 
injuries caused by defective containers in which goods are supplied, 
when the purchaser of the goods cannot twist the facts into a sale of 
the container, those doubts have been dispelled by Hadley v. Hillcrest 
Dairy,Inc.1 Several years ago, the case of Poulos v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. of Boston2 had held that the warranty of merchantability applied 
to a bottle as well as its contents. However, Mead v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling CO.,8 decided a few years afterwards, held that compensation for 
injuries occasioned by a defective bottle was within the scope of an 
implied warranty of merchantability only because the Supreme Judicial 
Court was able to conclude that, in the absence of evidence to the con-
2 C.L., c. 106, §2·509. 
8 Id. §2·501(2). 
§6.3. 1341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961). 
2322 Mass. 386, 77 N.E.2d 405 (1948). 
3329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d 757 (1952). 
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trary, it could assume that the purchaser of a soft drink from a vending 
machine purchases the bottle as weII as its contents. That a sale of the 
bottle was a prerequisite to the warranty was implicit in the decision. 
Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy) Inc.) was an action for damages sustained 
by handling a defective milk bottIe. Although the Court assumed that 
the bottle had been lent when its contents were sold, it was held never-
theless that as the bottle had been supplied under the contract of sale, 
the statutory requisites for a warranty covering the merchantability and 
fitness of the bottle were satisfied. In reaching this result, the Court 
relied upon an English case interpreting the English Sale of Goods 
Act.4 Both the English act and the Uniform Sales Act5 contain the 
same expression: "There is no warranty ... as to the quality or fitness 
. . . of goods supplied under a contract to seIl" unless certain condi-
tions are met. This, the English court had held, means that if the 
conditions are met the warranties are raised, irrespective of whether the 
defective goods supplied under the contract were sold. 
The Uniform Commercial Code (which did not apply to the Hadley 
case, since the transaction arose prior to October I, 1958) does not con-
tain the general negation of warranties of goods supplied under a con-
tract to seIl, or a sale. Instead, it says: "[A] warranty that the goods 
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller 
is a merchant." 6 (Emphasis supplied.) Although these words would 
not seem to leave any room for finding a warranty of merchantability 
to cover the container that has been supplied under the contract but 
that has been lent rather than sold, the Code provides specificaIly that 
goods that are not adequately packaged are themselves not merchant-
able. Therefore, it would seem that the Code would not cause any 
difference in cases like Hadley, although it might be necessary to say 
that the milk sold in a defective bottle is not merchantable rather than 
that the defective bottle supplied under the contract for the sale of 
milk is, in itself, not merchantable. 
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the Uniform 
Commercial Code does use terms sufficiently like those in the prior 
statutes to make the Hadley case of value as a precedent. A warranty 
of fitness for the particular purpose is implied if the seller has reason 
to know the particular purpose and that the buyer is relying upon his 
skill and judgment "to select or furnish suitable goods." 7 There is no 
specific limitation of the warranty to "the goods" that are sold, as seems 
to be the case with the warranty of merchantability. Consequently, a 
warranty that a milk bottle is fit for the purpose of ordinary handling 
might well be implied under the Uniform Commercial Code in a sale 
in which the buyer relies upon the seller to "furnish" the bottle, al-
though the bottle is not sold. 
§6.4. Commercial paper: Forged instruments. Mechanics National 
4 Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] I K.B. 668. 
5As found in former G.L., c. 106, §17. 
6 G.L., c. 106, §2-!H4. 
7 Id. §2-lI15. 
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Bank of Worcester v. Worcester County Trust CO.l was a suit by a 
drawee bank, that had paid a forged check, to recover the money back 
from the presenting bank. The check (for $3940) had been taken by 
the presenting bank for deposit to the extent of $340, and the balance 
of $3600 had been paid in cash to the person representing himself to 
be the depositor. Despite this payment of cash, the teller had required 
no identification and, in addition, ignored other very suspicious cir-
cumstances. The check was paid through a clearinghouse and was 
charged to the purported drawer's account by the drawee bank before 
the forgery was discovered. 
The Supreme Judicial Court was faced with two interrelated prob-
lems: first, whether the rule of Price v. Neal 2 applied to the facts, 
making payment by the drawee of a forged instrument final; and, 
second, if this rule did not apply, whether the clearinghouse rules that 
allow the return of certain items within a prescribed time bar, by nega-
tive implication, a return after that time. The Court decided that, 
although Price v. Neal is the law of Massachusetts, its doctrine of 
finality of payment could not apply to this case because the trial court 
had found that the presenting bank had itself been negligent in pur-
chasing the check. As it is well settled in this Commonwealth that such 
negligence as contributes to the deception of the drawee destroys the 
reason for the rule, the rule cannot operate to deprive the payor from 
recovering back the money paid under mistake. 
Had this transaction arisen after the effective date of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the answer to this question would have been other-
wise. The rule of Price v. Neal is adopted by Section 3-418 of the Code 
with the sweeping statement that payment is final in favor of a holder 
in due course or person who has changed his position in good faith, 
with exceptions only for liability for breach of warranty and limited 
recoveries of bank payment. The warranties imposed by Section 3-417, 
therefore, must contain the only exceptions to the finality rule in the 
usual case. These warranties include a warranty that the person ob-
taining payment has no knowledge that the signature of the drawer is 
unauthorized; but this warranty is limited to lack of knowledge, and 
does not cover the genuineness of the instrument in the absence of such 
knowledge. Recovery back simply because the instrument is a forgery, 
therefore, is limited to recovery from persons who are not holders in 
due course. And even the nonholder in due course who has obtained 
payment is protected if he has changed his position in good faith in 
reliance upon the payment. Negligence of the holder that is not so 
great as to amount to notice or bad faith which would keep him from 
becoming a holder in due course, therefore, is no longer a reason to 
deny operation of the rule of finality of payment in Massachusetts. 
It is perhaps conceivable that if the Code had governed the case the 
trial judge might have found that the presenting bank was not a holder 
in due course. It is doubtful, however, whether such a finding could 
§6.4. 1341 Mass. 465,170 N.E.2d 476 (1960). 
23 Burr. 1354,97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). 
5
Maleson: Chapter 6: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
§6.4 COMMERCIAL LAW 73 
have been justified under the facts of the case, which showed only sim-
ple negligence or carelessness. It would seem, therefore, that had the 
Code governed, recovery by the drawee would have been denied with-
out the necessity of reaching the second problem presented, namely, the 
effect of the rules of the clearinghouse upon the right to recover back 
payments when such rights would exist in the absence of clearinghouse 
operations. 
A bank that, under clearinghouse rules, must settle for an item first 
and then look at the instrument to see if it is genuine, or at the drawer's 
account to determine whether there are sufficient funds to cover the 
item, must have some right to return the item after it has looked. The 
clearinghouse rules involved in this case did contain such a right, by 
providing for "return items," with a sharp limitation on the time of 
such return through the clearinghouse. The Court held, however, that 
these rules were not sufficiently clear to bar a right of return after the 
short time limit had expired, when the right would have existed had 
presentment been made over the counter instead of through the clear-
inghouse. In other words, even if the rule of Price v. Neal had applied, 
the drawee obligated to settle under clearinghouse rules would have 
had a right to return the item, limited to the short time period pro-
vided. However, since the rule of finality of payment did not apply 
because of the negligence of the presenting bank, the clearinghouse 
rules did not make, by any negative implication, the item nonreturn-
able after the stated time limit. 
The problems discussed in this portion of the opinion, although 
covered only partially by the statutes in force in Massachusetts before 
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, are now included 
within the scope of Article 4 - Bank Deposits and Collections. This 
article provides for warranties by banks in the collection process com-
parable to those made by other holders who obtain payment.3 Thus 
the presenting bank warrants only that it has no knowledge that the 
signature of the drawer is a forgery, and not that the instrument is 
genuine. Therefore, payment to the presenting bank may not be re-
covered back unless the bank is not a holder in due course and has not 
changed its position in good faith. A mere settlement, however, as 
opposed to a final payment, does not prevent recovery if the bank acts 
quickly.4 Thus the rule of the clearinghouse permitting returns after 
the bank has had an opportunity to examine the instrument and ac-
count is carried into the Code.5 This rule does not, however, expressly 
prevent a return after final payment has been made or after the time 
for return has expired. If there is a right of recovery because of a 
breach of warranty, or because the bank is not a holder in due course, 
this right must survive final payment.6 
3 G.L., c. 106, §4-207. 
4 Id. §§4-301, 4-213. 
1\ See also G.L., c. 167, §55. This section was repealed upon enactment of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
6 See G.L., c. 106, §4-302. 
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Consequently, if the presenting bank in the Mechanics National 
Bank case had acted so negligently that its purchase was not in good 
faith, the rules of the Uniform Commercial Code clearly would have 
preserved the right of the drawee bank to recover back its payment 
despite the passage of the time limit for ordinary return items. The 
Code, therefore, would make no change in this portion of the law as 
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§6.5. Investment securities: Purchase in good faith. In a case 
whose facts had all the suspense of fiction, the Supreme Judicial Court 
in the 1961 SURVEY year had the occasion to inquire into the bona fides 
of an unusual bank transaction. The defendant bank in Elbar Realty, 
Inc. v. City Bank &- Trust CO.l took as a pledge securing a loan a 
United States bearer certificate of deposit that had been stolen from 
the plaintiff. The borrower, who stated that he was the agent for an 
undisclosed principal after a highly unlikely series of events, withdrew 
in small bills $30,000 of the $90,000 credited to the account which he 
had opened for the face amount of the loan. The circumstances were 
even more suspicious on the following day when the borrower with-
drew another $30,000 in small bills. The Court, after an excellent 
analysis of the elements of good faith, concluded that there had been 
sufficient evidence to warrant submitting the issue of good faith to the 
jury, but that evidence of the circumstances which arose after the loan 
had been made should not have been admitted without limitation to 
the issues on which it had relevance. Good faith vel non at the time of 
making the loan was not such an issue. 
This case, decided under the statutory law in force before the enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code, is an especially interesting one 
to analyze in light of the Code. The Court, in several footnotes to the 
opinion, states that the present provisions of the statutes comparable 
to those that governed the case are G.L., c. 106, §§3-302, 3-304, and 
3-307, as indeed they are. A discussion of this case in the Massachu-
setts Law Quarterly goes even further and assumes that not only are 
these the comparable provisions, but that they would control a similar 
case.2 However, Article 3 of the Commercial Code, unlike the prior 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, does not cover investment secu-
rities. Instead, a separate set of rules is provided by Article 8 to govern 
these instruments that are certainly first cousins to commercial paper 
but which serve different purposes. 
Since a United States Treasury certificate of deposit is commonly 
recognized as a medium for investment and is quoted as such in finan-
cial papers, there seems to be little doubt that it will be governed by 
Article 8 - Investment Securities. The differences between the treat-
ment afforded by this article and that required by Article 3 are sub-
stantial in several respects. In the first place, the terminology is differ-
ent. Since there is rarely any reason to treat the first holder of an 
investment security any differently from a remote holder (in fact, in-
§6.5. 1342 Mass. 262, 1711 N.E.2d 256 (1961). 
246 Mass. L.Q. 155 (1961). 
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struments issued in registered form are often reissued directly to the 
remote purchaser after his acquisition), the concept of holder in due 
course has been replaced by the bona fide purchaser and, in some cases, 
by the purchaser for value although not bona fide. 
The definition of the bona fide purchaser is at the same time both 
deceptively similar to and subtly different from the definition of the 
holder in due course. The general requirement of good faith is the 
same. The lack of notice requirements are substantially the same. 
The concept of value is quite different. Under Article 3 - Com-
mercial Paper, value generally means the extent to which the agreed 
consideration has been performed.3 Consequently, merely crediting 
the account of the borrower would not make a bank· a holder in due 
course of commercial paper. Therefore, circumstances existing at the 
time of withdrawals could affect a determination of whether the bank 
is a holder in due course to the extent of the particular withdrawal. 
Article 8, however, contains no specific definition of value. Conse-
quently, the general definition in Article I must apply, and this defini-
tion provides: H ••• a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires 
them (a) ... for the extension of immediately available credit 
whether or not drawn upon. . . ." 4 
This difference in the concept of value could have a substantial 
effect on the ultimate outcome of cases like Elbar Realty, Inc. A sepa-
rate determination of good faith must be made whenever credit granted 
by a bank is withdrawn, in order to determine whether the bank then 
becomes a holder in due course of commercial paper to the extent of 
the withdrawal; but no such new determination is required if the credit 
was originally extended on the security of an investment security rather 
than commercial paper. Of course, since the bank in the case had ac-
quired only a limited interest in this investment security, it could not 
prevail over the adverse claimant beyond the extent of its limited inter-
est. To the extent, therefore, that the credit had never been with-
drawn, the adverse claimant should prevail. But if, as is possible, the 
retrial of the Elbar case should establish that the defendant was a 
holder in due course to the extent of the first withdrawal of funds but 
not to the extent of the second, the division recognized would be one 
not permitted to transactions arising in the future, under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
§6.6. Consumer protection. The protection of consumer interests 
has proceeded through three statutes: one designed to preserve the 
rights that an injured purchaser has against an unpaid dealer although 
the debt is in the hands of a finance company, and two directed 
toward the lessening of deception. 
Many courts and legislatures have had the occasion to consider the 
plight of the purchaser of defective goods who is sued for their price 
by a finance company that is independent of the seller. Although the 
Massachusetts Court has held that clauses in instalment contracts that 
3 G.L., c. 106, §lI-lIOll. 
4 Id. §1-201. 
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purport to cut off defenses of the consumer against an assignee of the 
contract are inoperative,! it has also held that a finance company that 
acquires a negotiable instrument may be a holder in due course of the 
instrument although it was executed in connection with an instalment 
sale. Accordingly the buyer, who in financing his purchases executes 
negotiable instruments, may find that he must pay those instruments 
when they fall due even though the goods that he purchased are defec-
tive or worthless. 
In response to a growing belief that this situation is inequitable 
when the purchase is for nonbusiness purposes, the General Court has 
now provided that promissory notes given in connection with the pur-
chase of consumer goods must contain the printed words, "consumer 
note," and when they do so they shall not be negotiable instruments 
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Violation 
carries criminal sanctions and also bars collection of finance charges. 
An earlier bill to accomplish this purpose would have amended the 
Uniform Commercial Code to provide that any holder of an instru-
ment given for financing consumer goods would be subject to all de-
fenses that the obligor might have against the seller.a Because of the 
objection of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to such tamper-
ing with the uniformity of the Code, however, the Code was left intact 
by the final bill. Amendment of the Code would have given one ad-
vantage: for all purposes other than cutting off defenses, the instrument 
would have been governed by the Code. As it now stands, the status 
of these consumer notes is left in doubt. Whether they are to be gov-
erned by the law merchant, the Uniform Commercial Code, or the law 
of contracts is not clear. The differences may be substantial when lia-
bility of secondary parties on the instrument becomes involved. 
Competing bills would have provided for a notice requirement 
whereby the finance company could force the buyer to disclose his de-
fenses within a stated time period or else be barred from raising them.4 
This method is used in New York. It provides no protection to the 
consumer, however, if the defect in the goods has not become apparent 
by the time when he must notify the finance company. 
One rather patent loophole in the legislation as enacted is its limita-
tion to promissory notes. There is nothing to restrict the use of drafts 
on which a buyer may become liable as an acceptor; and since the stat-
ute is partially penal in nature, it probably could not be extended 
judicially to cover such instruments. 
§6.7. Banks and banking: Insurance funds. On May 12, 1932,the 
Central Credit Union Fund, Inc., was created to provide "a measure 
of relief in the existing financial emergency'" by assisting member credit 
§6.6. 1 Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958), noted 
in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§7.2, 9.2. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 595, adding §12C to G.L., c. 255. 
a See Thirty·sixth Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, 45 Mass. 
L.Q. No.4, p. 50 (1960). 
4 Ibid. 
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unions temporarily iJ need of cash or holding investments that could 
not be readily liquidated, through loans to those members.1 The orig-
inal duration of this corporation was five years, although the five were 
later extended to thirty. As it was about to enter its last year, this cor-
poration was made a permanent institution.2 It is interesting to note 
that this temporary expedient adopted during the depths of the de-
pression to meet the special financial needs of that period should be 
made permanent during this age of affluence. One chapter of our 
financial history has ended, and another has begun. 
The Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc., also created in 1932 for a 
period of five years,3 became a permanent institution some years ago. 
Two years after its creation, a deposit insurance fund was established 
under its administration.4 Since then, the Federal Government has 
entered the field of deposit insurance. Although the state's deposit 
insurance fund continues to insure amounts not covered by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the existence of the F.D.LC. does raise 
new problems in the operation of the Mutual Savings Central Fund, 
Inc. Accordingly, the sections of the statute enabling this corporation 
to take possession of banks in an unsafe condition no longer apply to 
banks whose members are insured by the F.D.LC.5 In addition, pos-
sible insurance of the insurer is eliminated by the new legislation, since 
insurance under the state fund is specifically denied to deposits in mem-
ber banks that have been made, directly or indirectly, by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
§6.8. Banks and banking: Loans and reserves. Loans to veterans 
guaranteed by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs under the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended, have been authorized in 
this Commonwealth since 1945.1 The original authorization was for 
five years after the termination of World War n. As the Congress ex-
tended its agreement to have the loans guaranteed, this Commonwealth 
extended the authority of its banks to make these loans. The General 
Court during the 1961 SURVEY year, however, has stopped trying to 
keep up with the year-by-year extensions of Congress and has removed 
its time limit.2 The present expiration time set by Congress is a fairly 
complicated formula that depends upon the length of service, the 
period of service, and the incurrence of disability for each prospective 
borrower. 
The permissible classes of mortgage loans by savings banks have been 
extended to include mortgage loans on real estate anywhere, relative 
to armed services housing guaranteed by the Secretary of Defense under 
§6.7. 1 Acts of 1932, c. 216. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 227. 
3 Acts of 1932, c. 44. 
4 Acts of 1934, c. 43. 
5 Acts of 1961, c. 175. 
§6.8. 1 Acts of 1945, c. 46. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 108. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 9
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/9
78 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §6.9 
Title VIII of the National Housing Act.s Savings bank construction 
loans in residential developments have been liberalized with the maxi-
mum limit of mortgage per parcel of real estate raised from $15,000 to 
$20,000, and the total permissible loans of this nature raised from 2 
percent of the deposits of the bank to 4 percent.4. 
§6.9. Banks and banking: Miscellaneous. The practice by super-
markets and some other merchants of selling registered checks will no 
longer be permitted unless the merchant can prove his solvency. Any-
one except a bank engaging in this business must file an annual state-
ment showing net worth of at least $200,000, or else must post a bond 
of $25,000 to $100,000, as the Commissioner of Banks deems necessary. 
Annual filing fees range from $100 to $300.1 
The procedure for investigating charges of improper conduct of bank 
officers has been changed. While in the past the Commissioner of 
Banks was required to certify facts to a board consisting of the State 
Treasurer, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions and Taxation, if the conduct of a bank officer was improper after 
written warning, it is now within the discretion of the Commissioner to 
notify the bank officials, and for them to meet and take appropriate 
action to protect the interest of the bank and its depositors.2 
Advertising anticipated rates of interest or dividends more than sixty 
days in advance is now prohibited unless the consent of the Commis-
sioner of Banks is obtained. The statute states: "No bank shall adver-
tise in any manner . . ." Whether a statement of past dividends will 
be held to be such an advertisement seems to be open. S 
Cooperative banks may now issue shares in either $100 or $200 de-
nominations.4. In the past, shares were always for $200, an amount set 
when interest rates were 6 percent. With present lower rates of inter-
est, it takes longer for regular investments to build up to $200. Con-
sequently, the lower valued shares may give depositors a sense of faster 
accomplishment. 
8 Id., c. 8M, adding par. U to C.L., c. 168, §g5. 
4. Acts of 1961, c. g27, amending C.L., c. 168, §g5(7). 
§G.9. 1 Acts of 1961. c. 607, adding §59 to C.L.. c. 167. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 226, amending C.L .• c. 167. §5. 
8 Acts of 1961, c. 269. adding §18A to C.L .• c. 167. 
4. Acts of 1961, c. Sgg, amending C.L., c. 170, §§lg, 16, 24. 
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